BTG Pactual NYC Conference

For your PM

Verdict: A good meeting overall. The CEO is a turnaround specialist and is applying that at several mines; the key now is to keep cutting costs at some of them. Era Dorada remains the main development priority, with first production targeted for 2028; it should add 100koz+ a year, with further upside over time. M&A remains an important growth avenue, with management looking at gold and copper opportunities across the Americas.

Aura Minerals (BTG NYC, 29 Sep 2026, small group with management). According to management, 2026 production lands around 350k GEO, within the 340-390k guidance, and grows about 20% in 2027 on the MSG turnaround and Brazil brownfield expansions, with Era Dorada (US$388m capex, mostly 2027) ramping up in 2028 at about 120 a year. Only the Borborema collars remain; no new hedging is planned. Minosa closes in 4-5 years. Dividends stay at about 40% of EBITDA minus recurring capex, with net debt to EBITDA close to zero. To watch: the Borborema expansion announcement, MSG costs and Era Dorada capex.

Small-group meeting with management at the BTG NYC conference. The transcript has no speaker names, so everything below is attributed to management, not to a named executive. Figures are as said and unverified.

Production: management said 2026 should be between 340,000 and 390,000 GEO, later describing this year as 'like 350', with about 20% growth into 2027. Formal 2027 guidance is still to be published. The 2026-2028 path of 360-370k, 420-440k and 550-600k came from an investor's recap, not from management. The long-term aim is 1 million ounces.

MSG: 60koz last year and less this year during the turnaround. Management targets 80,000 oz and an AISC of US$2,000-2,200 next year, down from US$3,500-4,000. It was bought for US$76m. Group AISC this year should be US$1,700-1,900, lower excluding MSG.

Era Dorada (Guatemala): construction started early this year and runs to early 2028, with ramp-up in 2028, at about 120 a year and upside if the permit allows. Capex is US$388m, mostly in 2027. Management says it has full community support, helped by its commitment to purify the municipality's water.

Brownfield: a Borborema expansion doubling capacity (+30-50% production) is to be announced, delayed a couple of months to size the capex. Almas reaches 3Mtpa this year, with 4Mtpa under study.

Minosa: 4-5 years of life left and it will shut down; some possibility to extend, not committed.

Hedging: only the Borborema zero-cost collars, set to protect a 3-year payback. No preventive hedging at current prices, and Era Dorada is not hedged.

Capital returns: the dividend policy is 20% of EBITDA minus recurring capex, and the company is paying close to 40%. Net debt to EBITDA is close to zero. M&A stays in gold and copper in the Americas, in mid-size assets.

To verify: the collar strikes (garbled in the transcript), Minosa's share of production (said as 20% and as 5%), and Era Dorada's first-years output.

IR and CFO, BTG NYC, mostly in Spanish. The transcript has no speaker names, so everything is attributed to management; figures as said, unverified.

For your PM

Verdict: A disappointing meeting that left mixed feelings: the turnaround looks set to take longer than expected. SMEs are still struggling, loan growth is lagging, cost of risk remains high and NIM is expected to compress.

Supervielle (BTG NYC, 29 Sep 2026, IR and CFO). According to management, asset quality has turned in retail but not yet in commercial: NPL should fluctuate at 5.5-5.9% before falling, above the 5.0-5.5% FY2026 range in the BofA table. Growth is only in dollar loans; the peso book is flat in real terms, with retail possibly growing from Q4, helped by ANSES mortgage funding and a Mercado Libre agreement. NIM compresses over time, offset by growth. The loan-growth and CET1 guidance questions were not asked and stay open. Most of the hour went on macro and the 2027 elections.

Key points

Asset quality: retail drove the cost-of-risk peak in 4Q25 and has fallen since; SMEs, hit by the 2025 rate spike, now behave like individuals. In Q3 commercial NPL formation keeps rising while retail falls.

NPL: expected to fluctuate at 5.5-5.9% before declining, above the 5.0-5.5% FY2026 range in the BofA table; about one point lower adjusting for clients delinquent at other banks but paid their salary through Supervielle.

Growth: retail origination is up, almost only in payroll and pension clients, but the real book may only grow from Q4. A Mercado Libre agreement covers personal loans. The peso book is flat in real terms.

Dollar lending: the only segment growing in real terms, mostly to exporters, at lower spreads than pesos. A recent Central Bank rule lets part of dollar deposits go to non-exporting companies. Dollar funding is cheap: a recent local 2-year issue paid 5.5%, 1 year 3.25%.

Mortgages: ANSES now offers 2- and 5-year deposits earmarked for new mortgages, about 12-13% of the system's mortgage stock: an accelerant, not a game changer, visible from Q4. Mortgages are 28% of the retail book.

NIM: compression expected in the medium term as inflation and rates fall, offset by growth, particularly in dollars.

Capital and funding: the Tier 1 gap with peers is a legacy of years without dividends, when Supervielle took earnings out through its insurance and asset management companies; higher leverage means a higher funding cost. Only part of current earnings can now be paid out.

Corporate projects: mining and the large energy projects are funded abroad; local banks serve their value chains through middle-market companies.

Macro: inflation about 30% in 2026 and an 18-21% consensus for 2027. Rate stability, disinflation and reserves are the variables to watch into the 2027 elections.

Still open: 2026 loan-growth guidance (9% or 10-15% real), the CET1 target range, the PBA repo tax case and IOL integration.

IR, BTG NYC, in Spanish. The transcript has no speaker names, so everything is attributed to management; figures as said, unverified.

For your PM

Verdict: Overall a good meeting, but it is now time to deliver rather than promise. Loan growth is running at roughly twice the sector's. Colombia's ROE needs to catch up with Chile's, so it is the key thing to monitor. Without the deposit scale of its peers, Itaú Chile will find it hard to lift profitability materially. Efficiency also has to improve, from a 46% cost-to-income ratio today to around 40%.

Itaú Chile (BTG NYC, 29 Sep 2026, IR). According to management, 2026 is a bridge year for Chile, with execution moving to 2027 once the reforms are enacted. Loans grow at twice the industry with cost of risk near 1% and CET1 at 11-12%, while the payout doubled to 60%. Colombia's exit lifts its ROE to 10-15%; Klap closes in Q4. The plan takes consolidated ROE from 12-13% to 15-17% through sight deposits, fees and efficiency (46% cost-to-income to below 40%). The first half was hurt by treasury positioning on inflation.

Key points

Macro: 2026 is a bridge year. Inflation 4.7% against 3% expected, GDP 0.3% against 2.5%, policy rate 4.5%. USD 45-55bn of approved energy, mining and infrastructure projects wait for the reforms to be enacted; execution moves to 2027.

Growth: loans growing more than twice the industry, commercial almost 3x (June). Drivers: a mining vertical covering the whole supply chain, multinational clients served regionally, dollar lending funded through the New York branch, and capital. Part of the dollar growth is FX.

Klap: all approvals received, closing expected in Q4; price about CLP 40bn, not yet final. It opens the merchant segment, where Santander (Getnet) is the main competitor.

Colombia: transfer executed on 1 August. ROE goes from 0-5% to 10-15% (10% in 2Q); Colombia is now about 12% of the book, roughly USD 100m a year of profit on USD 700-800m of capital (back of the envelope). USD 18m of costs remain this year; a service agreement with Banco de Bogotá runs to 2028.

Capital and dividends: CET1 11-12%, second only to Banco de Chile; the July dip to 11.1% reflects the Colombia provision and should return to about 11.5%. Payout raised from 30% to 60% of 2025 earnings, the highest in the bank's history.

ROE path: 12-13% consolidated today, 15-17% targeted under a plan to 2030 (Chile from 12-14%). Levers: non-credit fees and sight deposits (6% share, aiming for about 10%), cost of risk near 1%, cost-to-income from 46% to below 40%, and doubling the retail client base.

Treasury: the first half suffered from positioning for 3% inflation that came in at 4.7%. The bank hedges inflation, so peers with bigger mortgage books gained more; the second half is better.

Flows: pension-fund rule changes should bring about USD 250m of buying in the stock, roughly 41 days of average trading.

Still open: the tax-reform date and the deferred-tax hit, Klap's final price, and Colombia private banking. To verify: the Colombia restructuring cost (168 or 158) and the 512 transfer currency.

Small group with IR, BTG NYC. The recording starts mid-meeting and has no speaker names, so everything is attributed to management; figures as said, unverified.

For your PM

Verdict: Regulatory agenda net positive and leverage under control; the WACC formula is the main risk, and Enel São Paulo is the optionality to watch.

Equatorial (BTG NYC, 29 Sep 2026, small group with IR). According to management, the regulatory agenda is net positive: an X-factor update worth R$200-300m of EBITDA a year (decision by year-end) and a losses and delinquency update worth about R$304m of revenue a year. The WACC formula is the risk: 30-40bp lower if updated, with Pará's review next year. Leverage is 3.6x underlying against a 4.5x covenant, falling through tariff reviews. ANEEL is about to recommend Enel São Paulo's caducity; Equatorial is interested. Dividends stay low while capex runs at R$8bn a year.

Key points

Regulatory upside: X-factor update worth R$200-300m of EBITDA a year, decision by year-end. Losses and delinquency update worth about R$304m of revenue a year (R$1.7bn a cycle), discussion from October; Equatorial wants the two benchmarked separately. Annual capex recognition is under discussion; Equatorial already gets close to 100% of capex recognised.

WACC risk: with updated data it falls 30-40bp, about R$30m a year at Pará (R$9bn RAB, review next year). ANEEL deferred a new methodology to 2028. Equatorial's base case is a freeze then a rediscussion; the sell side's is a cut. With real rates near 8.5%, the spread is already thin.

Enel: ANEEL is about to vote to recommend São Paulo's caducity; the minister after the election decides. Equatorial is open to all three Enel concessions and would rather offer a full solution; São Paulo alone needs no equity raise, and Rio is described as a very complex asset.

Leverage and funding: 3.1x reported, 3.6x excluding the transmission gain, covenant 4.5x. A temporary preferred-equity instrument adds room: R$3bn prepaid, R$3bn available. 70% of net debt is CDI-linked; inflation-linked debt is swapped to CDI while rates are high. Deleveraging comes through tariff reviews over about two years.

Copasa and Sabesp: 30% of Copasa with 5 of 9 board seats, approved the day before; committees will include Equatorial executives. Sabesp is locked up until 2029. Generation and CSA could be recycled opportunistically.

Operations: losses 18% consolidated, Pará still above target. Quality compensation about R$270m a year, cut by over R$100m last year. Goiás opex comes down after its 2028 review. Distribution capex about R$8bn a year.

El Niño: net positive; injected energy up almost 10% in the north and northeast. Rio Grande do Sul, about 10% of the RAB, carries the climate risk.

Dividends: yield 1-2%; growth comes first, and a buyback waits for covenant room.

Still open: curtailment compensation and Echoenergia (not in the recording), PMSO and bad debt for 2H26-2027, and which X-factor requests pass.

CEO and Corporate Finance, BTG NYC, in Spanish. The transcript has no speaker names, so everything is attributed to management; figures as said, unverified.

For your PM

Verdict: Disciplined compounder with slower growth ahead: same-area guided to inflation +3% (from +5%), but a brownfield-led pipeline, strict M&A spreads and leverage room (4.5x against a 5.5x optimum) keep the growth story intact. On valuation, the stock looks fairly valued.

Parque Arauco (BTG NYC, 29 Sep 2026, CEO and Corporate Finance). According to management, growth slows from the 17% a year of the last five years: same-area growth is now guided at inflation +3% instead of +5%, with capex split 50% brownfield, 40% new malls and 10% multifamily. Acquisitions need at least 100bp over the cost of funding. Leverage of 4.5x leaves room to the 5.5x optimum after this year's equity raise. Contracts are mostly fixed and inflation-linked, so the fall in Argentine tourist sales at Kennedy barely touches revenue.

Key points

Growth: 17% a year over five years: 10 points from same-area productivity (inflation +5%) and 7 from capex. Same-area now guided at inflation +3%: rents +2, conversion of department-store space +0.5, non-rent income such as parking and retail media +1, and efficiency nearer +0.5 than +1.5.

Capital allocation: every project competes at board level against a monthly cost of funding per country. Brownfield earns 300-500bp over it, acquisitions need at least 100bp, greenfield 300-400bp. Recent cap rates: about 9% in Colombia, 8-10% in Peru, 7-8% in Chile.

Position: third player in each market by GLA (Chile 13%, Peru 16%, Colombia 12%), the largest not integrated with a retailer, and first in revenue per square metre in all three. Anchors are 37% of GLA against 50% and 80% at peers, with no related-party contracts.

Multifamily: six projects in operation and three in development across Colombia, Peru and Chile. Projects are only announced when construction is imminent.

Leverage and funding: 4.5x net financial debt to EBITDA after this year's equity raise; 5.5x is the optimum, 5-6x the range. Debt is 70% bonds with about five years' duration; Chile and Peru borrow at inflation +3%, Colombia at inflation +6% from banks. Maintenance capex targeted at 4% of EBITDA.

Contracts and inflation: 12-13% of GLA expires each year and about one point changes tenant; contracts carry step-ups of inflation +1-2%. The company is net long inflation, recognised only at the year-end fair value.

Sales: same-area sales in the quarter fell 2% in Chile and rose 9% in Peru and 8% in Colombia. Lower Argentine tourism hit Kennedy, but anchors pay no variable rent, so revenue barely moves.

Dividends: half of earnings paid, half reinvested; dividend per share rising about CLP 10 a year towards 50-55. The tax cut from October should allow a bit more of both.

Still open: Ripley's exit at Kennedy, Paseo Quilín, multifamily yields, and competition in Colombia after Mallplaza's purchase.

3x1 with management, BTG NYC, in Spanish, Portuguese and English. The transcript has no speaker names and ends mid-sentence, so everything is attributed to management; figures as said, unverified.

For your PM

Verdict: Steady, defensive story: the distribution reform is finally moving and hydrology has turned, but the Q1 gas gain was a one-off and, in management's own words, this is not a double-digit growth company.

Enel Chile (BTG NYC, 29 Sep 2026, 3x1 with management). According to management, the distribution reform is finally moving: a hub-like model with guaranteed recovery and fixed 20-year remuneration, with investment plans due in 1H27. Hydrology turned after a late start to the rains, and the production target should be met. The Q1 gas gain was a one-off LNG sale at war-era prices. BESS grows by 900 MW, hybrid with solar, while system oversupply compresses pure-play returns. Management itself says this is not a double-digit growth company.

Key points

Tariff receivables: US$60-70m for Enel, about US$900m for the sector. The government is choosing between an international and a local issue; clients pay from 2028, and the regulatory period is extended to 2030.

Distribution reform: from the reference-company model to a hub-like model with guaranteed recovery and fixed 20-year remuneration, at returns broadly in line with today. Investment caps per distributor; plans presented in 1Q-2Q27, a new cycle from 2030. Smart meters can now be charged to customers.

Hydrology: rain arrived on 11 July, about 45 days late, after a tough period of high spot prices. August was one of the wettest months in 100 years and El Niño should peak in Q4; the production target for the year should be met, with reservoirs above plan.

Gas: the Q1 gain came from selling LNG at war-era prices while Argentine gas covered needs. Extraordinary in price, not a change of strategy; some trading every year, but not at this level.

Commercial: sells 30-32 TWh against about 24 TWh produced, short in the first half and long in the second. Won two short-term regulated auctions (1.5 TWh for one year, 3.3 TWh a year for four) at high prices; avoided mining bids where competition compressed prices. A 15-year regulated auction comes in January.

BESS: 200 MW today, 900 MW more in two waves (450 MW in 2027), all hybrid with solar. System forecasts doubled to over 10 GW, compressing arbitrage and capacity payments, and the minister has flagged oversupply. Enel mixes owning, renting and buying BESS capacity.

Holding and other: no strategic interference from the group (three independent directors, related-party deals at market). ADR conversion discussed with Citi. Q3 results on 28 Oct, call on 29 Oct.

Still open: FY2026 net income guidance, the receivables issue format, the size of Enel's distribution investment plan.

Small group with management, BTG NYC. The recording starts mid-meeting, ends mid-sentence and is heavily garbled; no speaker names, so everything is attributed to management; figures as said, unverified.

For your PM

Verdict: Strong portfolio story: the Ecopetrol deals and Frontera give a large, stable base with low-cost upside and a foothills gas option; catalysts are the new government, the Bogotá listing in December and doubling free cash flow.

Parex (BTG NYC, 29 Sep 2026, small group with management). According to management, the Ecopetrol deals and Frontera give a large, stable base: Magdalena adds 7,500 bbl/d net from day one, Putumayo is a carry for half the incremental output, and Frontera's fields decline about 6% a year. Low-cost Llanos exploration keeps working, and foothills gas is the transformational option, with the Ulama well spudding next month. At US$80, operating cash flow is about US$1.15bn. Catalysts: the new government, a Bogotá listing in December and free cash flow doubling.

Key points

Exploration engine: 40-50 prospects a year, over 150 in inventory. LLA-111: six prospects drilled last year, four discoveries at US$2m a well, two already on stream; trucks and pipeline capacity are the limit.

Base and Frontera: waterflood and infill keep the base flat and small exploration adds about 5% a year. Quifa and CP06 decline about 6% a year or less, not 30%, so they are left to decline gently. US$300m bargain gain, about US$600m of tax assets, synergies of US$40-60m a year.

Ecopetrol: Magdalena gives 7,500 bbl/d net from day one, starting within weeks, for about US$50m a year over five years (about US$90m a year of netback). Putumayo: a US$170-175m carry over 6-7 years for 50% of incremental output and, from year 3, of existing output; 15-20k bbl/d of incremental expected.

Foothills gas: about US$100m committed, targets of the 50,000 boe/d type, 40%+ chance on eight independent targets; Parex pays the first two wells, then 50/50. Ulama spuds next month, about six months to a result, next to existing pipelines. Gas sells short term at about US$17 as Venezuelan and Cusiana supply decline.

Cash flow: at US$80, about US$1.15bn from operations and about US$300m left after capex and dividend; at US$40, debt and interest only. Capex stays below two thirds of cash flow; next year's capex indicatively about US$350m. C$2bn returned over the cycle.

Catalysts: the new government, a Bogotá listing in December (access to about US$6bn of index and long-only money), and free cash flow doubling. Not a first mover in shale; no Venezuela. The GeoPark stake would be sold at about US$12.20.

Still open: opex and differentials, the tax surcharge, debt repayment and leverage target (not in the recording); Frontera terms and production to verify.

IR and CFO, BTG NYC, in Spanish. The transcript has no speaker names and starts with the end of the previous investor's meeting; everything is attributed to management; figures as said, unverified.

For your PM

Verdict: Overall a good meeting. Its deposit scale and UF sensitivity make Santander Chile one of the best-positioned banks in the current environment. ROE should be 24%+ in 2026, and the economic recovery in 2027 should boost loan growth.

Santander Chile (BTG NYC, 30 Sep 2026, IR and CFO). According to management, 2026 ROE ends at 24% or a bit more, helped by inflation income, with normal years at 22-24% and above 20% through the cycle. Once the reconstruction law is enacted, they expect a V-shaped recovery in 2027-2028, with loans growing 6-7%. CET1 is 11.2% and about 70bp of relief could come within six months, supporting a 60-85% payout. The effective tax rate falls to 17-18% under the new regime. Normal cost-to-income is about 35%.

Key points

Macro: 2026 disappointed: four mining incidents kept output at 11-12m tons, gasoline rose 50%, and the peso went from 850-870 to about 970. Once the reforms are enacted, management expects a V-shaped recovery in 2027-2028, not a gradual one.

Reforms: the reconstruction law passed both chambers and the constitutional review; promulgation expected next week. MK4 is positive, but its first-loss mechanism for housing does not fit industry economics, and the stamp-tax change creates some wait-and-see.

Projects: about US$90bn over four years, 90% in mining in Antofagasta and Atacama. Santander earns in the second round (contractors, machinery imports, trade) and from infrastructure project finance fees.

Inflation: a structural long UF position of about US$8.5bn; about 15bp of NIM per 100bp of inflation, about 20bp this year at 4.5% inflation.

Funding: best spreads in bonds, time deposits and bank lines. Interest-bearing cost 3.8% against Banco de Chile's 3.3% because of mix; demand deposits are 19% of funding against 20% at Chile and 22% at Banco Estado.

Capital and dividends: CET1 11.2% with a 60% provision; about 70bp of relief from the market-risk model within six months. Payout 60-85%, historically 60-70%, decided at the March board.

Tax and efficiency: effective tax 21-22% in a normal year, 17-18% under the new 23% rate. Cost-to-income 32.5% year to date, about 35% normalised, ambition close to 30%; funds cut from 60 to 29, Gravity moving the core to the cloud.

Guidance: ROE 24%+ in 2026, 22-24% in normal years; NPL 3.3-3.4% at year-end; cost of risk towards 1.2%; non-interest income about 5% this year, stronger in 2027; loans 6-7% in 2027.

Still open: 2027 guidance, the Gravity savings figure, and Más Lucas economics.

Management, BTG NYC, in Spanish. No brief was prepared, so this records what was said rather than contrasting it. The transcript has no speaker names; everything is attributed to management; figures as said, unverified.

For your PM

Verdict: The best-governed Mexican FIBRA, after a transformational Macquarie deal; delivery now depends on the tender reaching 95%, integration by January 2027, and margins back to 84-86%.

FIBRA MTY (BTG NYC, 30 Sep 2026, management; no brief prepared). According to management, the Macquarie acquisition, bought at a 10% discount to NAV, doubles the platform and internalises its management for US$172.4m, about US$7m a year better off. The second tender closes on 27 Oct, aiming for 95% and delisting. Priorities now: organic growth slightly above inflation, margins from 76% at Macquarie back to 84% and 86% by end-2027, and 100% industrial by end-2027. Leverage is moderate (25% net LTV) and S&P upgraded to BBB+.

Key points

Governance: internally managed with no fees; management paid mostly in certificates tied to FFO and NAV per certificate; 80% independent board, all committees chaired by independents. Management says this set the benchmark for Mexican FIBRAs.

Track record: from 9 properties and US$150m of market cap in 2014 to about 400 properties, US$6.5bn of assets and US$4bn of market cap; 220% total return, about 11% a year.

Portfolio: 60% of revenue from northern Mexico, light manufacturing; contracts mostly in dollars and 5+ years long, against 3 years or less at peers.

Macquarie: bought at a 10% discount to NAV, a 7.3% in-place cap rate with upside to 7.5-8%. 82% acquired in the first tender; the second, for the rest, closes on 27 Oct, targeting 95% and delisting. US$172.4m to internalise management, about US$7m a year of net benefit; property management now in-house.

Balance sheet: limits of 35% LTV and 5x net debt to EBITDA; net LTV 25%, about 4x. S&P raised the rating from BBB- to BBB+, above the sovereign.

Strategy: 100% industrial by end-2027 (80% now, 11% retail); 46% of office value and all legacy retail sold or under agreement; Macquarie's retail sales are just starting. Growth is now organic, aiming slightly above inflation.

Margins and integration: legacy margin 84%, Macquarie 76%; target 86% by end-2027. Both platforms on SAP by 1 Jan 2027; Q4 2026 should consolidate 95%+.

Still open: tender result, pace of retail and office sales, regional market deep dive offered by management.

IR, BTG NYC, in Spanish. The transcript has no speaker names, so everything is attributed to management; figures as said, unverified. Political small talk and comments about third parties are left out.

For your PM

Verdict: Good, but not great. Rincón de Aranda is on track, with lifting costs expected to fall from US$12/boe today to US$5.5/boe once the CPF is online. The urea project may make sense for Pampa, but its heavy capex keeps free cash flow negative until 2030. Power deregulation is clearly helping.

Pampa (BTG NYC, 30 Sep 2026, IR). According to management, Rincón de Aranda reaches 45k boe/d by mid-2027 once VMOS and the processing facility are online, with lifting costs falling to US$5.5/boe and about US$700m of oil EBITDA at US$60. Power deregulation adds margin, including US$100m next year from secured gas transport. The US$2.7bn urea plant produces from end-2029 and is free cash flow positive in 2030. Parent leverage of 1.4x would peak at about 2x, with project finance kept outside the bond perimeter.

Key points

Rincón de Aranda: 45k boe/d by mid-2027, held flat for a long time. VMOS is 85% complete with first oil in Q1 2027; Pampa has 50k bbl/d of capacity there and 12k in Oldelval. The processing facility should be ready around December; lifting cost then falls to US$5.5/boe in 2027-2028.

Oil economics: about US$700m of oil EBITDA in 2027 at US$60; about US$100m more per US$10/bbl; cash breakeven about US$35-36/bbl.

Gas: from November Pampa sells its own gas to its plants. Demand rises to about 22m m3/day by 2028: own plants 10m, CESA/FNG 6m, urea 3.5m, Chile 1.5m, plus winter sales. The mix stays about 85% gas, 15% oil.

Urea: a 2.1m tonnes a year plant using 3.3m m3/day of gas and 70 MW of own power; with Profertil it would cover Argentina's deficit. Sold first locally by truck and rail, then Chile, Uruguay and Brazil. Production from end-2029, capex US$2.7bn peaking at about US$1.2bn in 2028, free cash flow positive in 2030.

Power: deregulation favours combined cycles with own gas. Margin retention 15% this year, 25% next, 35% after; B2B PPAs 20% from 2029; spot now in dollars. EBITDA about US$650m in 2027, US$600m in 2028, about US$500m long term as PPAs roll off.

Transener: an operation and maintenance concession with about US$300m of regulatory EBITDA, about US$320m expected this year. The AMBA I line tender (270 km) is expected by year-end, paid through end-user bills.

Debt: parent leverage 1.4x, up to about 2x with urea; project finance during construction stays outside the bond perimeter. Bonds average about 7.1-7.2% with 8-10 years of life.

Still open: urea IRR and offtake, RIGI savings, Transener's preemptive rights, oil marketing; 2026 free cash flow to verify.

IR and a recently joined executive, BTG NYC, in Spanish. The transcript has no speaker names, so everything is attributed to management; figures as said, unverified. A personal political view given off the record is left out.

For your PM

Verdict: The fundamentals are moving in the right direction: a solid pricing strategy with room to catch up with regional peers, and EBITDA margins recovering, with TMA targeting 40% from 26.5% LTM. Free cash flow conversion, at about 20% of EBITDA, still trails peers; 25% would be a good outcome. The TMA customer remediation has an 18-month deadline, but management aims to finish sooner.

Telecom Argentina (BTG NYC, 30 Sep 2026, IR and a new executive). According to management, the remedies are on track: a local buyer process is well advanced, and once the migration is done, Telecom and TMA can merge. TMA's margin has already risen from about 10-11% to close to 30%, aiming at Telecom's 40% within 2-3 years. Prices rise faster than inflation, and capex falls from 18-20% of revenue to about 15% after two years. Management sees the 7-8% free cash flow yield as too low. The 2027 election is the main risk to shareholder value.

Key points

Scale and mix: about US$7bn of revenue and US$2.3bn of EBITDA consolidated; Paraguay and Uruguay 8-9% of revenue and 6% of EBITDA. Mobile about 45% of revenue, fixed 30%, pay TV 10%, B2B 10%.

Market and remedies: 56% mobile, 44% broadband, about 18% pay TV before the remedies. 6m mobile and 211k broadband subscribers go to a new operator (not Claro) at about 9% of the market; local buyers, process well advanced, 18 months to complete, two-year non-compete.

Pricing: increases of 2.5-3% a month against about 1.7% inflation, with fewer promotions; mobile ARPU buys about 80% of a Big Mac, still low against the region.

Margins: legacy Telecom near 40%, a record since 2018. TMA from about 10-11% to close to 30% after cutting about US$100m of Telefónica service costs and 1,300 people; target 40% over 2-3 years, with a third of the sites removed. Headcount could fall up to 50% from the combined peak; AI is entering customer care.

Capex and cash flow: 18-20% of revenue for two years (5G from 25% to 80% coverage by end-2028, fibre), then about 15%. Free cash flow conversion about 20% of EBITDA against about 25% at peers; a 7-8% yield that management sees as too low.

Balance sheet: debt mostly in dollars, but about 60% of assets have dollar value against 27% debt to assets; the next 12 months of debt service is covered with cash. Bad debt 1.4% of B2C revenue, 1.8% overall.

Politics: continuity is very positive for the company; under a Kicillof win, dividends could be blocked and a devaluation would squeeze liquidity, though the business survived 2002.

Still open: the buyer's identity and terms, the leverage target, use of the US$300m dividend authority, refinancing plans.

IR, BTG NYC, in Spanish. The transcript has no speaker names and starts after the introductions; everything is attributed to management; figures as said, unverified.

For your PM

Verdict: The story remains intact. Transformation on track: an EBITDA base of US$8bn rising to US$12bn by 2032 on VMOS and Argentina LNG, with leverage contained despite negative 2027 free cash flow; the downstream windfall is temporary and politics is the main risk.

YPF (BTG NYC, 30 Sep 2026, IR). According to management, YPF now has an EBITDA base of at least US$8bn, rising to about US$9bn in 2027 and US$12bn by 2032 as VMOS (first oil early 2027) and Argentina LNG ramp up. A new oil RIGI project could add up to about 240k bbl/d. 2027 free cash flow turns negative (-US$2.5bn) on LNG equity and taxes, yet leverage stays at 1.2-1.3x. Downstream earns a windfall margin of about US$30/bbl but sits 15% below parity, closing gradually into 2027. Approved RIGI projects are seen as protected under a hostile government.

Key points

Oil RIGI: RIGI now covers upstream oil. YPF filed a six-block project, 100% owned with a concession to 2059, producing about 55k bbl/d and able to add up to about 240k, with about 1,150 wells and all output exported through VMOS; the ministry wants four vehicles, approval expected shortly.

VMOS: YPF's stake rose from 25% to 30% (164k bbl/d). Inauguration in December, first oil in January-February 2027; an expansion of 200k bbl/d is being planned, possibly leaving open-access space.

Earnings path: EBITDA of at least US$8bn from 2026 (US$3bn downstream this year, US$2bn normally), about US$9bn in 2027 with US$8bn of capex, US$12bn pro forma in 2032 at US$70 Brent. Free cash flow +US$2.5bn in 2026, -US$2.5bn in 2027; leverage below 1x, then 1.2-1.3x; US$3.5bn of cash entering 2027.

Argentina LNG: US$29bn of capex; about US$15bn from 4-5 export credit agencies plus about US$1.5bn commercial debt; YPF's 36% equity is US$4.7bn over four years, outside its capex. FID in November, December at the latest. ENI and XRG are 20-year offtakers; YPF's 4 MTPA drew five times the interest; Asian buyers, price on Brent, JKM and a third index.

Disposals: Metrogas US$780m (10% paid), Profertil US$635m, conventional assets about US$400m; conventional oil down from 90k bbl/d at end-2023 to about 15k.

Downstream: 15% below parity at current cracks, about 5% at normal ones; margin close to US$30/bbl against a normal US$15-20. Buffer ended in June, 1% increases since; the gap closes gradually into 2027. Refinery at 100%, maintenance deferred to year-end.

YPF Luz and politics: YPF Luz is core (EBITDA US$400-500m, net debt about US$1bn); the sale process is paused but open. Under a hostile government, approved RIGI projects are protected by law and arbitration; LNG could be delayed if not yet approved.

Still open: shale constraints and rig plan, binding LNG offtakes, ranking of incremental cash.

IR and CFO, BTG NYC. The transcript has no speaker names and its last part is garbled, so everything is attributed to management; figures as said, unverified.

For your PM

Verdict: Resilient demand and fuel pass-through, though Q4 margins contract; the FAA audit in late October is the key binary risk for US expansion, and the buyback vote comes in October. Delta is also pushing the company towards better practices. On a relative basis, I prefer Aeromexico to Volaris.

Aeromexico (BTG NYC, 30 Sep 2026, IR and CFO). According to management, fuel costs are largely passed on to fares and demand is strong after the World Cup lull, with load factors of 90% in August and about 86% in September; Q4 margins contract with fuel at US$3.20/gallon. New US routes from Mexico City remain blocked by a DOT order despite Mexico's compliance, and the FAA audit result is due in late October. Pilots' talks are ongoing. A US$100m-a-year buyback goes to shareholders in October.

Key points

Fuel and margins: most of the fuel increase is passed on to fares, offsetting it; other cost inflation still squeezes margins. Q4 guidance assumes US$3.20 per gallon, with margins contracting.

Demand: the World Cup paralysed travel from June to mid-July; since then demand is strong, helped by a strong peso. Load factors 90% in August and about 86% in September, a normally weak month; Q4 is peak season.

Positioning: 70% of capacity international, 30% domestic. At home Aeromexico competes with Viva and Volaris only at its entry fare, slightly above them, and kept most of Interjet's routes and passengers.

Labour: most staff unionised; the flight attendants' contract is settled and pilots' talks are ongoing. Strike notices are standard practice in every contract review.

US access: a DOT order blocks new US routes from Mexico City airports, though Mexico met all three US demands and the US acknowledged it. The FAA audit result is due mid-to-late October; aircraft are already registered, so a downgrade would mainly hit future expansion.

Growth elsewhere: Mexico City-Milan announced and Venezuela resumed; Barcelona ran above 80% from day one.

Capital returns: a US$100m-a-year buyback goes to shareholders in October, valid for 12 months if approved.

Still open: dividend policy (garbled), pilots' outcome, response to a Volaris-Viva merger.

Management, BTG NYC, in Spanish. No brief was prepared, so this records what was said rather than contrasting it. The transcript has no speaker names; everything is attributed to management; figures as said, unverified.

For your PM

Verdict: Not a very exciting story, but it is moving in the right direction. All eyes should be on the ADR and the consolidation of the Brazilian transmission platform. The TGI tariff review is the other key thing to monitor.

GEB (BTG NYC, 30 Sep 2026, management; no brief prepared). According to management, an ADR of about US$1bn is approved and ideally launched in February, aiming at US$10m of daily liquidity and a float near 14%. The TGI tariff resolves years of dispute (WACC up about 100bp, volumes corrected, hedge costs recovered). Brazil merges into a 50/50 vehicle with CDPQ with US$600m of firepower, and Cálidda's concession was extended 10 years. Enel Colombia is well placed for El Niño despite the intervention. Management sees no governance risk from Bogotá's elections for about 2.5 years.

Key points

ADR: listing approved; about US$1bn, with the district's ~9.6% secondary and a primary of about twice that. February is the ideal timing, executable within about three months of a decision; 70 international investors already sounded out; SOX work well advanced.

Brazil: GEB's assets merge with CDPQ's into a 50/50 vehicle: US$90m for the assets formerly shared with Axia and US$600m more including Patria and Brookfield assets. About COP 240-260bn of extra earnings; US$600m of firepower for operating assets rather than greenfield auctions. Closing in October, final on 11 Nov; Q3 call about 14 Nov.

TGI: the tariff, due the day after the meeting, raises WACC about 100bp, corrects volumes for a 30% drop in demand and recovers hedging costs over five years (100%, then 80%, 60%).

El Niño: Enel Colombia's reservoirs are at 93% against 73% for the system, so no spot purchases are needed. The 7 Sep intervention caps thermal margins at 6-10% and pays hydro below the spot, but is better than the earlier mechanism.

Peru: Cálidda's concession extended 10 years with a US$600m Sierra expansion, after three years of bilateral talks; five state bodies must sign. Cálidda is about 13-16% of group EBITDA of about US$1.6bn. REP's main line expires in 2031; renewal may require building the Iquitos line.

Governance and regulation: staggered board terms and higher independence requirements; management sees no material risk for about 2.5 years whoever wins Bogotá's mayoral election. Three or more CREG commissioners likely to change within a year.

Still open: ADR structure and timing, the Brazil binding offer, REP renewal.

CEO, CFO and IR, BTG NYC. The transcript has no speaker names, so everything is attributed to management; figures as said, unverified. The EBITDA path shown (R$5.56bn to about R$18-20bn) is a Bradesco forecast, not guidance.

For your PM

Verdict: High-visibility growth story: contracted, inflation-linked fixed revenue roughly doubling to BRL 20bn by 2032 on a structural cost edge; delivery of the 2027-2031 projects and leverage peaking near 4x in 2Q27 are what to watch.

Eneva (BTG NYC, 1 Oct 2026, CEO, CFO and IR). According to management, Eneva sells capacity, not energy, with a structural cost edge of about 50% from owning its gas and terminals. Inflation-linked fixed revenue rises from about BRL 9bn to almost BRL 20bn by 2032, and the aim is to double the 9.4 GW contracted within five years. Leverage peaks near 4x in 2Q27, then falls fast as Azulão 2 starts on 1 July 2027. Dividends stay at the 25% minimum until about 2030. The main risk is delivering the 2027-2031 projects.

Key points

Model: Eneva sells capacity and reliability, not energy. About 80% of its EBITDA comes from fixed capacity payments; generation costs are indexed to LNG, so there is no commodity risk.

Cost edge: own gas fields with 300 km of private pipelines, or its own LNG terminals next to its plants; no third-party pipelines, terminals or take-or-pay, plus a 75% income-tax discount in the north. About 50% lower total cost than the marginal competitor, which sets auction prices.

Market: the ministry plans 40 GW of new capacity by 2035. Eneva has 9.4 GW contracted, won 37% of new builds in 2018-2026, and aims to double within five years.

Revenue: fixed revenue from about BRL 9bn this year to almost BRL 20bn by 2032, inflation-linked; another 3.6 GW at the same price would add BRL 10-11bn a year for 15 years.

Balance sheet and dividends: about 3x net debt to EBITDA now, about 4x at the 2Q27 peak, then fast deleveraging; capex heavy for four years, then falling sharply. Minimum 25% payout for 2-3 years, ample room after 2030.

Exploration and dispatch: drilling in Paraná from end-2027 (results 2028-29); Solimões could backfill Manaus around 2030-31. Dispatch helps a given year (about R$1bn in 2021) but is not the thesis.

Milestones: Azulão 2 (590 MW) on 1 July 2027, Sergipe 2028, Ceará 2029, last project 2031. Partner decision on the latest auction projects within weeks.

Still open: small-scale LNG, exports, Futura, NFE assets, the Venezuela MoU, USD capex hedging.

CEO and VP Finance, BTG NYC, in Spanish. The transcript has no speaker names, so everything is attributed to management; figures as said, unverified.

For your PM

Verdict: Mallplaza is now more focused on brownfield, but recent acquisitions were richly priced; in my view they overpaid. The valuation does not screen cheap. That said, the company has real scale, good assets and a proven ability to turn Tier C and B malls into Tier A.

Mallplaza (BTG NYC, 1 Oct 2026, CEO and VP Finance). According to management, Mallplaza is the leading Andean mall platform, with about US$600m of EBITDA, 92% fixed rents and a mix half outside traditional retail. Two 2026 acquisitions add 340,000 sqm plus 150,000 sqm of development, lifting Colombia's share from 4% to 7%, with scale driving margins. The balance sheet could take more leverage, and the payout stays about 40%. Near term, Chilean pension funds keep selling for about a month to fit new benchmarks, which management sees as a technical overhang.

Key points

Scale: 45 malls in Chile, Peru and Colombia, 51-52 with the new deals; 2.5-2.7m sqm of GLA. Revenue about US$700m, EBITDA about US$600m: Chile 400, Peru 120, Colombia 80.

Position: first in Chile with about 35% share, second in Peru and Colombia by GLA; first by EBITDA in Chile and Colombia. The main regional partner of brands such as H&M and IKEA.

Mix: 50% of GLA in non-traditional formats (essential services 32%, food and entertainment 15%, mixed use 8%); pure retail down to 21%. Competitors are closer to 70/30 traditional.

Transformation: Mall Plaza NQS in Bogotá went from Tier C to Tier A, tripling traffic, revenue and EBITDA: bought for about COP 450bn plus COP 120bn invested, now worth over COP 1tn. Target: Tier A from 40% to 70% of the portfolio.

Contracts: rent 92% fixed; small stores escalate at CPI+2% in Colombia and Chile; anchors on 30-year and sub-anchors on 15-20-year contracts; renewals above contracted rates.

Acquisitions and margins: two 2026 deals add 340,000 sqm plus 150,000 sqm of development; Pactia assets on the balance sheet from 1 Oct; Colombia share from 4% to 7%. Scale helps margins: Colombia's central office grew 5% for 40% more GLA; services run centrally from Chile; parking, advertising and logistics growing.

Capital and flows: a robust balance sheet that could take more leverage; payout about 40% (30% minimum). Chilean pension funds keep selling for about another month to fit new benchmarks.

Macro: Peru very solid, Chile recovering, Colombia more complicated.

Still open: Gran Plaza antitrust decision, Peru occupancy, leverage after the deals, the 40-hour law.

CFO and IRO, BTG NYC, in Spanish. The transcript has no speaker names, so everything is attributed to management; figures as said, unverified.

For your PM

Verdict: One of the best meetings of the conference. The current Grupo Argos management delivered the Sprint programme at Cementos Argos, so I believe they can deliver here too. Celsia is the challenge: El Niño should have a significant impact if the government's market intervention continues. Cementos Argos volumes should hold up. All eyes are on how the US$2.1bn of cash at Cementos Argos is deployed.

Grupo Argos (BTG NYC, 1 Oct 2026, CFO and IRO). According to management, ACE 1.0 is on track: Cementos Argos is firing in every market and Colombia alone nearly secures its US$75m target, US$2.1bn is earmarked for US aggregates, and the holding and Odinsa are being slimmed down into an asset manager. Celsia is the big lever (margin from 30% to 40% by 2028), but a new government shortage statute has made its El Niño outcome binary. The COP 500bn buyback finishes before next year's AGM and will likely be extended.

Key points

Celsia and El Niño: a shortage statute three weeks ago capped prices at COP 500, centralised dispatch and blocked gas options, so generators lose the margin they had prepared. The sector proposes letting prices work with a gradual pass-through; management warns of a blackout. If the rules revert, Celsia navigates El Niño.

Celsia's 40% margin: generation and distribution only; Caoba and C2 leave the perimeter (85-90% margins, 90% eaten by their own interest, about COP 2tn of equity). Headcount from 2,500 to 2,100, about 1,500 short term, below 1,000 later. Debt reduction is real, not moved off balance sheet; dividend flat for 2-3 years.

Cementos Argos: 25% margin, over 75% cash conversion, negative net debt. Colombia towards 14m tonnes in 2027 at 35% share, about US$65m more EBITDA at US$85-90 a tonne; Panama from about US$25m to US$40m; Dominican Republic, Honduras and Puerto Rico strong.

Venezuela: an import terminal to ship cement from Cartagena; consumption about 10 kg per person against 240 kg in Colombia; the expropriation claim is upside.

Argos Materials: US$2.1bn of Summit proceeds earmarked for US aggregates: a Caribbean export platform built at under 5x EBITDA, bolt-ons, possibly a US joint venture. The aim is to rebuild about US$300m of EBITDA with half the capital.

Asset management: Odinsa becomes Grupo Argos Asset Management; Grupo Argos takes about 30% of each vehicle as anchor LP, the rest from institutions, with strong Middle East interest. Holding staff from 60 to 12; Odinsa SG&A from COP 80bn to 30bn by 2027.

Buyback and liquidity: COP 115bn of COP 500bn done, the rest before next year's AGM, likely extended; sellers offered only COP 39bn of COP 100bn sought. Liquidity up about 4x since ACE; a US$80m block moved the price 2%.

Still open: the regulatory outcome, Ticsa, ACE's organic/portfolio split, asset-management fees, 2Q26 one-offs.